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Abstract 
This paper reports that prices of NASDAQ stocks are more volatile around the market 
opening than closing. Evidence fiom individual stocks indicates that there is a systematic 
relationship between the excess opening volatility and trading activity. Much of the excess 
opening volatility is related to two factors, bid-ask bounce and price formation. For inactively 
traded stocks, bid-ask bounce contributes almost all of the transitory volatility as opposed to 
20?! of the transitory volatility for actively traded stocks. On the other hand, price formation 
is the primary source of the difference between the opening and closing variances for actively 
traded stocks. We also find price formation occurs in the absence of trading as quotes 
updated prior to the 9:30 AM. start of trading reflect new information. 
I . Introduction 
That opening prices are more volatile than closing prices for stocks traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has become a stylized fact since the work 
of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll and Whaley (1990). Their original 
* We appreciate the comments made by Tim Bollerslev, Russ Emll, Raymond Kan, Bill 
Kracaw, Harold Mulherin, Chris Muscarella, Cathy Niden, Dennis Sheehan, Renk St&, 
seminar participants at the University of Toronto, and session participants at the 1994 
FMA meetings (St. Louis). All errors are our own. 
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conjectures cite the structure of trading on the NYSE as making opening prices 
more volatile than prices in the balance of the trading day. However, subsequent 
empirical studies by a number of authors report results similar to the NYSE for 
different exchanges and trading mechanisms. More recently, the focus has turned 
to the impact of trading on price formation; trading itself plays an important role 
in the price discovery process because trading conveys private information. In a 
noisy rational expectations framework, Grundy and McNichols (1989), Brown and 
Jennings (1989), and Shalen (1993) show that following a non-trading period, 
greater informational uncertainty on the open than on the close may cause the 
first price of a trading session to contain a transitory volatility component absent 
from the last price. By definition, transitory volatility is the variance in excess of 
that generated by information flow. Arnihud and Mendelson (1991) and Gerety 
and Mulherin (1994) present empirical evidence consistent with the resolution of 
uncertainty as trading progresses during the day. 
The focus of this paper is to investigate the relationship between trading 
frequency and two factors which are sources of transitory volatility, price 
formation and bid-ask bounce. Because there is a well known empirical 
relationship between trading frequency and volatility, trading frequency is a 
natural candidate for studying transitory volatility. Price formation implies that 
the uncertainty regarding the price of a security is gradually reduced through 
multiple rounds of trading. Bid-ask bounce refers to the fluctuation of 
transaction prices between the bid and ask, which naturally arises as buy and 
sell orders amve randomly. The relationship between trading frequency and the 
sources of transitory volatility is addressed by partitioning the sample into deciles 
based on trading frequency. In order to separate price formation effects from 
bid-ask bounce effects we use both bid-ask quotes and transaction prices in the 
analysis. 
Price formation models predict higher opening variance for the true price of an 
asset. Consequently, inferences should be based on the evolution of the true 
rather than the observed price. The use of quote data (either the bid price, the 
ask price, or the average of the bid and ask) has been previously advocated as 
an alternative to transactions data for drawing inferences about the path of the 
true price (Kaul and Nimalendran (1990)). While quotes are not to be confused 
with the true price, quote-based return variance may better reflect the variance of 
the true return than does transactions data. 
Bid-ask bounce affects the estimate of the ratio of open-to-open return variance 
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to close-to-close return variance in several ways. First, it inflates the closing 
variance for stocks traded in markets that lack an opening spread, such as the 
NYSE (Amihud and Mendelson (1987)). Second, it inflates both variances in 
markets where both an opening and closing spread exist, which may bias the 
estimated variance ratio (Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994a)). Third, if either the 
bid-ask spread or the distribution of transaction prices within the bid and ask 
quotes differs si@cantly between the open and close, the observed variance 
ratio may deviate from the variance ratio derived from the true equilibrium price. 
Comparing variance ratios calculated from quote data with those calculated from 
transactions data provides evidence of the effect of bid-ask bounce on transitory 
volatility. 
To our knowledge there has not been a thorough examination of intraday 
transitory volatility using quote data. The lack of this line of research can be 
attributed mainly to the nonexistence of pre-opening quotes on the NYSE. For 
NYSE stocks, the opening procedure is a call auction, so pre-opening quotes are 
generally not available. We overcome this problem by examining NASDAQ stocks, 
for which both pre-opening quotes and closing quotes are available. Another 
benefit of using NASDAQ data to study price formation is that quotations are 
typically available for over one hour prior to the start of trading. Therefore, it is 
possible to test whether price discovery occurs from quotes in the absence of 
trading. Although the role of pre-play or "cheap talk" signaling remains 
unresolved in the theoretical literature, the fact that market participants do 
update their quotes prior to the start of trading indicates that these quotes may 
contain some economic value. 
We begin our analysis by establishing that the open-to-open return variance is 
sigmflcantly greater than the close-to-close return variance for our sample stocks. 
Since NASDAQ employs the same trading mechanism throughout the day, this is 
further evidence that there are factors other than trading structure contributing 
to greater opening volatility. Similar results for other markets that do not open 
with a call auction are found in Amihud, Mendelson and Murgia (1990), Amihud 
and Mendelson (199 l), Choe and Shin (1993) and Forster and George (1994). 
The primary finding of this paper is that there is a systematic relationship 
between the source of transitory volatility and trading frequency. We ident@ and 
explore two potential sources of transitory volatility, price formation and bid-ask 
bounce. For actively traded securities, price formation is found to be the primary 
source of transitory volatility in both transactions data and quote data. In 
contrast, for inactively traded securities, bid-ask bounce is the source of higher 
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open-to-open variance as open-to-open return variances are elevated in transactions 
data, but no more volatile than close-to-close returns using quote data. 
We perform a test of whether the elevated variance in open-to-open returns is 
related to price formation. Using the method suggested by Gerety and Mulherh 
(1994), we show that quote-based 24-hour variance decreases throughout the 
tradmg day for the most actively traded stocks. This result is consistent with an 
implication of price formation models in that price uncertainty is gradually 
resolved as trading conveys more information to the market through time. For 
inactively traded stocks, the 24-hour return variance is nearly constant 
throughout the day, failing to support price formation in inactive securities. 
Additional evidence of price formation is provided by the quotes available prior 
to the 9:30 A.M. opening of trading. Using a measure of prediction error, we 
show that the latest pre-opening quote contains less prediction error than both 
the previous closing quote and earlier pre-opening quotes. We also find that the 
number of pre-opening quotes sigruficantly increases when the magnitude of the 
overnight return is large. While there is no formal model for analyzing the role of 
quotes in the absence of trading, these results are also intuitively consistent with 
the notion that price discovery takes place before the market opens. 
To assess the importance of a bid-ask bounce component to the variance ratio, 
we examine the open-to-open and close-to-close variance ratio by using midquote 
based returns instead of transaction based returns. On average, the difference in 
variances between the open and close decreases by about 67% when the bid-ask 
bounce effect is eliminated. We further find that systematic changes in the 
location of transactions prices within the bid and ask quotes, but not the width 
of the posted bid-ask spread, cause the decline. Our regression analysis reveals a 
strong positive relation between the variance ratio of open- to-open to 
close-to-close returns and the ratio of the variance of opening locations to the 
variance of closing locations. 
While the bid-ask bounce effect accounts for a substantial portion of the 
elevated opening variances in the full sample, further analysis reveals that its 
impact on the opening and closing variances varies substantially across stocks 
with different trading frequencies. For the least frequently traded decile, the 
difference in opening and closing variances nearly disappears when the bid-asked 
bounce effect is eliminated. However, for the most frequently traded decile, the 
impact of bid-ask bounce is marginally significant. Since the finding for 
infrequently traded stocks may be caused by the inclusion of a large number of 
zero returns, we demonstrate that recalculating the variance ratio using only 
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those days where the open-to-open and/or the close-to-close return is non-zero 
produces no simcant changes in the result. 
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes institutional 
background, Section 3 outlines our empirical methods, Section 4 describes the 
data, Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
11 . Institutional Background 
The NASDAQ system is a decentraked screen-driven market consisting of 
broker-dealers transmitting quotes and transactions via an electronic network. 
Telephone communications between dealers supplement the computerized 
systems. Dealers are required to post their individual bid-ask prices on the 
system. The reported bid-ask price or inner spread consists of the highest bid 
and lowest ask prices recorded by the dealers. The quotes transmitted by 
NASDAQ almost always represent prices at which the dealers will trade for their 
own account as customer limit orders are rarely represented. In contrast, the 
NYSE is a centralized market, organized around specialists who are charged with 
maintaining "continuous and orderly markets" in the stocks for which they are 
solely responsible. The NYSE specialist maintains bid-ask prices representing 
either customer orders in his possession or the willingness of the specialist to 
trade for his own account. 
There are two major differences between NASDAQ and the NYSE which are 
important to this study. First, the NASDAQ system contains no formal procedure 
for opening trading. By contrast, trading on the NYSE opens with a call auction 
with the specialist charged with stabilizing prices. At 9:30 A.M. EST, NASDAQ 
dealers may begin entering trades into the system. Individual dealers are 
expected to enter transactions in chronological sequence within three minutes of 
execution. These conditions prevail throughout the trading day. Thus, for 
NASDAQ securities, any differences between opening and closing variances cannot 
be attributed to differences in the trading mechanism between the open and 
close. 
Second, the quotation reporting system of NASDAQ opens much earlier than 
the trading system. In our sample, most stocks record the first quotation of the 
day by 8:30 A.M. Consequently, dealers are able to transmit their bid-ask prices 
to the market well in advance of the opening transaction. Thus, we can observe 
the dealers' unconditional opening quotes prior to the first trade, which reflect 
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the Information set for the dealers prior to the first transaction. This allows us to 
directly observe the effect of bid-ask bounce on the opening trade. The existence 
of quotes before the market opens also provides a unique opportunity to examine 
price discovery in the absence of trading. 
III . Empirical Methods 
We use the variance ratio test to both assess whether NASDAQ stocks are 
characterized by higher transitory return volatility at the open and to test for 
evidence of price formation. This methodology has been used by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987, 1991) and Stoll and Whaley (1990) to test whether there is a 
sigrzlficant difl'erence between open-to-open and close- to-close return variances. 
Define the observed logarithmic price of stock i at time t as 
Pit consists of two components, the true price, P:,, which is the expectation of 
the true share value conditional on all public information available at time t, and 
a shock eit associated with private information, liquidity demands, and dealers' 
responses. We write the daily return for stock i at time t as 
The variance ratio of open-to-open returns relative to close-to-close returns is11 
where superscripts "o" and "c" denote open and close. Since variances of true 
returns measured at the open and close are the same, any difference between 
the observed variances at the open and close will be due to the effects of 
transitory volatility which impact the second and third terms in the numerator 
and denominator. 
To test the si@icance of the difference between opening and closing variances, 
1) We leave time subscripts t in the variance equation to make the lag structure clear. 
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we use a procedure which is based on cross-sectional median variance ratios. 
This procedure avoids several problems with earlier tests in the literature. 
Previously, researchers calculated the variance ratio of open-to-open returns 
versus close-to-close returns for each firm in the sample, and used the standard 
t-test, F-test or Binomial test to test the null hypothesis that the mean of 
cross-sectional variance ratios is one although the cross sectional mean of the 
variance ratios is upward biased due to Jensen's inequality. Ronen (1994) and 
Jones and Kaul (1994) point out that the validity of these tests relies on strong 
assumptions about stock returns. For example, since stock returns are 
cross-correlated, use of the standard t-test and the Binomial test for testing if 
the average of the variance ratio is one may not be appropriate. The standard 
F-test for testing the equality of the opening and closing variances may be biased 
since the numerator and denominator contain overlapping information and stock 
returns are not normal. The direction of the bias for the F-test is unpredictable. 
Ronen proposes a test based on the GMM procedure. In the context of this 
paper, the GMM test involves more than 1000 moment restrictions. Since a GMM 
system with 1000 moment restrictions is not tractable, we consider alternative 
tests. 
Our empirical tests are designed to address these criticisms and to maintain 
tractability. We first calculate the cross-sectional median of the individual stocks' 
variance ratios in each month of the sample period. Then we use these 
cross-sectional medians as independent time-series observations to perform a 
conventional t-test. By using medians rather than means, we avoid the Jensen's 
inequality problem. Since we only use one stock's variance ratio per month 
rather than averaging the variance ratios of all the stocks in our sample, cross 
sectional dependence is not an issue. In addition, overlapping observations are 
not a problem because we do not use the standard F-test for testing variance 
equality. Another noteworthy point is that the distribution of sample medians is 
asymptotically normal regardless of the underlying distribution under fairly weak 
assumptions. Thus, each time-series observation can be treated as a normal 
variate, which justifies the use of a t-test. Since both the quote-based and 
price-based monthly median variance ratios are asymptotically normal, we can 
further apply the conventional t-test to the difference between the price-based 
and quote-based variance ratios. 
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IV. Data 
The initial data consist of all trades and quotes for all NASDAQ-NMS stocks 
that exist continuously on the 1990, 1991 and 1992 ISSM NASDAQ tapes and 
on the CRSP NASDAQ tape. Trades and quotes flagged by the ISSM as errors, 
non-standard delivery trades, and all BBO-ineligible quotes (except for pre 
-opening quotes) are eliminated, where BBO stands for "Best Bid/ Offer"2). We 
construct a sub-sample of available firms by selecting those firms that satisfy the 
following criteria: 
There must be at least 190 valid observations in each of the three 
years. 190 days corresponds to the number of trading days in a 9 month 
period. A pair of two consecutive trading days is considered a valid 
observation if each day contains at least two trades and one quote. This 
criterion is the minimum for meaningful analysis. 
Stock prices at the open and close must be always greater than or 
equal to $3 throughout the sample period. The same criterion is employed 
by Stoll and Whaley (1990). This criterion is severe, but it reduces noise in 
variance estimates caused by the minimum tick size. 
The number of stocks meeting these criteria is 472 out of an original sample of 
2342 stocks available in 1990, 2275 in 1991, and 2506 in 1992. 
Summary statistics of characteristics of sample f m s  are presented in Table 1. 
The capitalization of firms at the end of 1989 ranges from $10 million to 
$10,935 million with median capitalization of $175 million. About 80% of the 
firms are in the top three deciles of all NASDAQ firms. Hence our sample 
represents relatively large NASDAQ stocks. 
From this sample, we extract trade prices and quotes for use in the analyses. 
For trade data, we define the opening transaction as the first standard delivery 
trade occurring after 9:30 A.M. and the closing transaction as the last standard 
delivery trade of the day. The opening quote is defined as the last reported quote 
prior to the opening trade and the closing quote is the last reported quote prior 
2) BBO-ineligible quotes are closing quotations. trading halts, pre-opening indications, and 
non-firm quotations. Trades which are in sequence but are reported late are retained in 
the data set. For details, see the ISSM manual (1993). p. 14. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Stock Characteristics 
Summary statistics for market capitalization and average price for the 472 NASDAQ 
stocks in the full sample for 1990 to 1992. Market capitalization represents the 1989 
year-end capitalization measured in million $. Average price is daily average (closing price 
over the 3-year sample period measured in dollars. The full sample consists of all CRSP 
stocks for the 1990 to 1992 period that meet our selection criteria. Selection criteria for 
the sample are the following. The initial data consist of all trades and quotes for all 
NASDAQ-NMS stocks that exist continuously on the 1990, 1991 and 1992 ISSM NASDAQ 
tapes and on the CRSP tapes. We construct a sub-sample of available firms by selecting 
those that satisfy the following criteria: (1) There must be at least 190 valid observations 
in each of the three years. A pair of two consecutive trading days is considered a valid 
observation if each day contains at least two trades and one quote; (2) Stock prices at the 
open and close must always be greater than or equal to $3 throughout the sample period. 
There are 472 firms from the original sample of 2342 NASDAQ stocks available in 1990, 
2275 in 1991, and 2506 in 1992 that meet these criteria. 
Capitalization Average price 
(million $) ($1 
Mean 383.7 
Std. Dev. 822.8 
Minimum 10.5 4.89 
Quartile 1 81.7 12.10 
Median 174.6 17.47 
Quartile 3 370.0 25.67 
Maximum 10935.2 89.54 
to 4:00 P.M. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the trades and quotes included in our 
sample. The opening is a significant fraction of daily trading activity with median 
values of 10.8% of daily trades and 8.6% of daily volume.3) Typically, the first 
trade occurs less than 24 minutes after 9:30 A.M. and the first quote occurs 65 
minutes prior to 9:30 A.M. On the close, the final trade takes place, on average, 
3) In Table 2, the open is defined as the first three minutes of trading when calculating 
the percent of total daily trades and the percent of total daily volume at the open. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Trading Characteristics 
Summary statistics for trading characteristics for the 472 NASDAQ stocks in the full 
sample and for the trading frequency deciles for 1990 to 1992. For each variable, we 
calculate the daily average for each firm during the 3-year sample period and report the 
cross-sectional mean. To create the trading frequency deciles, we first rank all firms in the 
sample based on the daily average number of transactions and divide them into ten 
groups (group 1 includes 49 stocks, groups 2 to group 10 include 47 stocks each). # of 
transactions is the number of trades daily. Opening transactions is the ratio of the 
number of transactions occuning during the first three minutes of trading to the total 
number of daily transactions measured in %. Share volume is the number of shares 
traded daily measured in 100s. Opening share volume is the ratio of the number of shares 
traded during the first three minutes of trading to the total number of shares traded daily 
measured in %. Minutes elapsed from 9:30 AM to the 1st trade is the time delay in 
opening the stock measured in minutes. Minutes elapsed from the last trade to 4:00 PM is 
the time lag from the last trade to the close measured in minutes. Negative values indicate 
last trade times after 4:00 PM. 
Variables Trading frequency decile 
Least Most 
All freq. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 freq. 
# of transaction 61 9 12 16 20 24 31 40 59 93 306 
Opening 
10.8 20.9 17.6 14.8 12.6 10.8 8.8 7.4 6.2 4.8 3.7 
transactions(%) 
Share volume 
1137 141 223 289 380 419 542 751 1082 1802 5788 
(x 100 share) 
Opening share 
8.6 18.4 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.6 6.6 5.2 4.2 2.9 2.0 
volume(%) 
Minutes elapsed 
from 9:30 AM to 24 54 46 39 30 25 18 13 9 5 2 
the 1st trade 
Minutes elapsed 
from the last 19 53 42 34 27 21 13 9 4 -2 -11 
trade to 4:00 PM 
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19 minutes before 4:00 P.M. The last updated quote is generally recorded three 
hours before 4:00 P.M. This last statistic reflects the fact that NASDAQ quotes 
are updated less frequently than their NYSE counterparts. 
The bid-ask spread for NYSE stocks is known to be associated with trading 
volume and trading frequency. Branch and Freed (1977) and Harris (1994) show 
that more actively traded stocks have narrower quoted spreads. Peterson and 
Fialkowski (1994) extend this result to show that the effective spread is also 
smaller for more actively traded stocks on the NYSE. Furthermore, the number of 
trades is more closely related to the volatility of returns than trading volume 
(Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994b)). For these reasons, we partition the sample 
into deciles based on the average number of transactions occurring daily for each 
stock in the sample. To create the trading frequency deciles, we first rank all the 
f m s  in the sample based on the daily average number of transactions and then 
divide them into ten approximately equal-size groups (decile 1 contains the least 
frequently traded stocks). 
V . Results 
5.1 Opening Volatility on NASDAQ 
The presence of higher volatility for open-to-open vs. close-to-close returns has 
been documented for a number of exchanges which use various mechanisms for 
opening trading. Unlike exchanges previously studied, NASDAQ uses the trading 
procedure employed throughout the day for the opening as well. To test for 
elevated opening volatility for NASDAQ stocks, we use transaction price-based 
returns to calculate the variance ratio d 2(r0i~/c 2(rcit) for each of the 472 stocks 
in each month for the sample period from January, 1990 to December, 1992. 
Next, we compute the cross-sectional median of these variance ratios in each 
month. The time-series mean and corresponding standard error of these medians 
are reported in Table 3 (See median-based results). For transaction price-based 
returns, the time-series average of cross-sectional median variance ratios is 1.12 
with standard error 0.01, which is si&ruficantly greater than 1 at a 5% 
confidence level. It indicates that, on average, the open-to-open return is about 
12% more volatile than the close-to-close return for NASDAQ stocks. Our result 
is consistent with existing research even though the opening procedure for 
NASDAQ differs from other markets. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Open-to-Open vs. Close-to-Close Variance Ratios 
Summary statistics for the open-to-open vs. close-to-close varianceratios for the 472 
NASDAQ stocks in the full sample and for the trading frequency deciles for 1990 to 1992. 
We calculate the variance ratio for each firm in each month, and get the cross-sectional 
median (mean) variance ratio in each month. Next, we obtain the time-series average and 
standard error of median (mean) variance ratios across the 36-month sample period. To 
create the trading frequency deciles, we first rank all firms in the sample based on the 
daily average number of transactions and divide them equally into ten groups (group 1 
includes 49 stocks, groups 2 to group 10 include 47 stocks each). For the median-based 
variance ratio, the t-test is for testing whether the mean difference between the price-based 
and the quote-based variance ratio is zero. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
- - - 
Based on transaction prices Based on quoted midpoints 
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. t-stat 
All 1.12 (0.008) 1.23 (0.010) 1.04 (0.008) 1.14 (0.012) 12.96 





For the purpose of comparison with the previous literature, we also 
compute the cross-sectional mean of variance ratios in each month and 
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report its time-series mean and standard error (See Table 3 mean-based 
results). The time-series average of cross-sectional mean variance ratios is 
1.23, which is comparable to results reported in the literature for NYSE 
stocks. While the mean-based result suggests a 23% difference between the 
opening and closing volatilities, the median-based result indicates the 
difference is only 12%. Our result is consistent with the finding of Jones, 
Kaul and Lipson (1994a) that mean variance ratios (as a measure of central 
tendency of the variance-ratio distribution) reported in the literature contain 
substantial upward biases. 
The results for each trading frequency decile, reported in Table 3, are similar to 
those for the full sample for price-based returns. Since the level of trading 
activity is correlated with the percentage spread, the trading frequency decile 
results suggest that both the level of trading activity and the posted bid-ask 
spread do not affect the relative volatility of open-to-open to close-to-close returns 
when returns are calculated using transaction prices. 
In the next section, we investigate the extent to which the greater volatility at 
the open is caused by the bid-ask bounce at the open and close. 
5.2 Bid-Ask Bounce 
Our goals in assessing the role of bid-ask bounce on the variance ratio result 
are threefold. First, establish that bid-ask bounce effects exist in the variance 
estimated from transaction prices. Second, determine the extent to which bid-ask 
effects cause the variance ratio to deviate from one. Finally, investigate the 
determinants of the bid-ask bounce behavior of individual stocks around market 
opening and closing. 
5.2.1 Variance Ratio 
To appraise the existence and relative sipficance of bid-ask bounce, we 
examine the variance ratio estimated from the midpoint of the bid and ask 
quotes instead of transaction prices. As noted by Pfleiderer (1990), systematic 
patterns in transactions behavior at the open and close of tra- may be 
responsible for some of the increase in opening vs. closing volatility. These 
patterns may be induced by closing trades motivated by an impending trading 
halt as described in Brock and Kleidon (1992), or by changes in the quoted or 
effective bid-ask spreads related to the no trade period. By estimating the 
variance ratio with quote-based returns, the effects of systematic patterns in 
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transactions are eliminated. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics of monthly variance ratios estimated using 
quote-based returns. For the full sample, the time-series average of the median 
variance ratio is 1.04 with standard deviation of 0.01. Again, the median variance 
ratio is si@icantly greater than 1, The average of the variance ratio declines 
from 1.12 to 1.04 when quote-based returns instead of price-based returns are 
used to estimate variances. In other words, the variance at the open is only 4% 
higher than that at the close when the bid-ask effect is eliminated, in contrast to 
a 12% difference when bid-ask bounce is included. This represents a 67% 
reduction in the deviation of the variance ratio from one and the reduction is 
statistically sigmficant . 
For the sample partitioned by trading frequency, Table 3 shows that the 
time-series average of the median variance ratio for the least frequently traded 
decile is 1.01 for quote-based returns and not statistically different than 1. Using 
price-based data, the least frequently traded decile has a variance ratio of 1.13. 
Therefore, there is a decline of 92% in the relative volatility of open-to-open to 
close-to-close returns when bid-ask bounce is eliminated for inactively traded 
stocks. In the remaining deciles in Table 3, the quote-based variance ratio 
generally increases as trading frequency increases. The most actively traded decile 
has a quote-based variance ratio of 1.10, a decline of 0.025 or 20% from 
price-based returns which is the smallest decline for any decile. Although the 
decline of the variance ratio is relatively small for the most actively traded 
stocks, the difference between the price-based and the quote-based variance ratio 
is still statistically significant at the 1% level using the t-test described in Section 
3. The differences between the price-based and quoted-based variance ratios are 
statistically sigrvficant for the other deciles in our sample as well. 
Our results indicate that a substantial portion of the increase in opening vs. 
closing volatility is caused by changes in the systematic patterns of bid-ask 
bounce at the open and close. The hypothesis that the bid-ask bounce effect is 
an important source of the elevated opening volatility is supported by the 
evidence. Furthermore, the results show that the primary source of greater 
opening volatility for inactive stocks is bid-ask bounce. However, there are other 
si@cant sources of transitory volatility for actively traded securities. 
5.2.2 Bid-Ask Spreads 
As  noted earlier, there are two possible sources of the bid-ask bounce effect 
that cause greater volatility at the open. First, the bid-ask spreads could be 
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systematically wider at the open than the close.4) lcond,  there could be 
systematic patterns in transactions within the bid-ask spread and these patterns 
could differ between the open and the close. In this section, we use two 
measures to study the source of bid-ask bounce, the quoted bid-ask spread and 
the location of transaction prices within the bid and ask quotes. 
We define the bid-ask spread for a stock as the inside spread, i.e. the 
difference between highest bid and lowest ask price posted on the NASDAQ 
system. For comparative purposes, we then divide the quoted spread by the 
midpoint of the bid and ask quotes to obtain a percentage spread. To trace the 
behavior of the spread, we examine the mean percentage spread at hourly 
intervals over the trading day as well as at the 9:30 A.M. opening. The 9:30 A.M. 
quote is taken as the last quote posted prior to 9:30 A.M. The quote at the end 
of each hourly interval is taken as the prevailing quote at each time point. 
As shown in Table 4, the average percentage spread across our sample f m s  
declines over the course of the trading day from 2.71% at 1 1:00 A.M. to 2.65% 
at 4:00 P.M.5) However, these declines are not statistically siWcant. 
Surprisingly, the pre-opening spread of 2.66% is narrower than the spread for 
any other period except the close. This may reflect public limit orders being 
displayed on NASDAQ, the presence of stale quotes, or it may be a result of the 
price formation process.6) Furthermore, when we examine the intertemporal 
pattern in the average of percentage spreads, there is little variation in the 
spread over the day. Finally, although the width of the posted spread varies 
across trading frequency deciles, within each decile the width of the spread is 
relatively constant over the trading day.7) These results do not support the 
hypothesis that changes in the width of the quoted bid-ask spread are the 
source of bid-ask bounce. 
We now turn to the systematic patterns in transactions. In particular, we use a 
4) This possibility is cited by George and Hwang(1994) in their study of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. 
5) Our result is consistent with previous research, e.g. Hanis(1989), McInish and 
Wood( 1992). Porter( 1992), and Chan, Christie and Schultz( 1995). 
6) One possibility is that the tighter spreads represent different opinions among dealers in 
the sense of Harris and Raviv(1993). Hencem although there is more uncertainty the 
spread is smaller. 
7) The results for the trading frequency deciles show that the findings of Branch and 
Freed (1977). Harris (1994). and Peterson and Fialkowski (1994) that inactively traded 
stocks have wider posted spreads apply to NASDAQ as well. 
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Table 4. Percentage Bid-Ask Spreads for the Opening vs. Successive Periods 
The percentage quoted bid-ask spreads at various time points during the trading day for 
the 472 NASDAQ stocks in the full sample and for the trading frequency deciles for 1990 
to 1992. For each time period, we calculate the average percentage spread across the 
3-year sample period for each firm and report the cross-sectional mean. The quote at the 
end of each interval is taken as the prevailing quote at each time point. To create the 
trading frequency deciles, we first rank all firms in the sample based on the daily average 
number of transactions and divide them equally into ten groups (group 1 includes 49 
stocks, groups 2 to group 10 include 47 stocks each). 
Mean percentage spread by trading frequency decile 
Least Most 
Time All freq. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 freq. 
location measure to identify systematic patterns in trading at the open and close. 
The statistic is defined as 
pt - Midqote, 
Location = 1  ask, - Bidt) 
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where Pt is the price at time t, Askt and Bidt are the ask and bid quotes in 
effect at time t, and Midquotet is the average of bid and ask quotes.8) With this 
measure, trades identified as at the bid, the midquote, or the offer have locations 
of -1, 0, and 1 respectively. Regardless of the trading price, a location for any 
trade can be calculated in similar fashion.9) 
Since we are also interested in the effective bid-ask spread, note that the 
combination of location and quoted spread can be conceived of as a measure of 
the effective spread. Define bid-ask bounce at time t ,  Bt, to be the difference 
between transaction price Pt and Midquotet divided by the Midquotet. We can 
rewrite Bt in terms of the spread and the location as follows 
1 B, = QuotedSpread. Location 
Note that the effective spread is usually written as 2 lBt 1 hence, 
Effective Spread = Quoted Spreadt I Locationt I (6) 
In Table 5, we report the surnmary statistics for locations as well as the 
probabilities that an  opening or closing trade is identified as at the bid, the 
midquote, the ask, or in between. We calculate the average location for each firm 
during the three-year sample period, then we report the cross-sectional mean, 
standard error and median for all firms. Other statistics reported in Table 5 are 
calculated in a similar way. From Panel A, the locations of the opening trade and 
closing trade are, on average, -0.03 and 0.00. The opening location is 
sigmficantly less than zero implying the average opening trade occurs below the 
rnidquote price and closer to the bid than the ask. The difference between 
average locations at the open and the close is si@cant at the 5% level. The 
absolute location, which is directly linked to the effective spread, is 0.91 at the 
open and 0.78 at the close, suggesting a 17% rlifference. Since the quoted spread 
at the open and close are essentially the same (2.66% vs. 2.65% from Table 4), 
17% difference in the absolute location implies a 17% difference in the effective 
8) This statistic is related to the Keim (1989) location parameter. We drop stock i's 
subscript for simplicity. 
9) The locations of transactions occuning outside the bid-ask spread may reflect either 
block trades or stale quotes. Locations outside the bid-ask spread are truncated in 
calculating the average location for a stock. 
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Table 5. Locations for the Opening and Closing Trades 
S m a r y  statistics for the location parameter at the open and close of trading for the 
472 NASDAQ stocks in the full sample and for the trading frequency deciles for 1990 to 
1992. We calculate the location of the trade (absolute value of the location) for each firm 
on each day and get the time-series average of the location (absolute value of the location) 
for each f m .  Then we obtain summary statistics across 472 firms. 
For Var(L), we calculate the time-series variance of the location for each firm and report 
summary statistics across 472 firms. To create the trading frequency deciles, we first rank 
all finns in the sample based on the daily average number of transactions and divide them 
equally into ten groups (group 1 includes 49 stocks, groups 2 to group 10 include 47 
stocks each). 
Opening trade Closing trade 
A. Locations 
Statistic Mean S.E. Median Mean S.E. Median 
I LI 0.909 (0.001) 0.910 0.782 (0.002) 0.779 
Var (L) 0.881 (0.002) 0.888 0.747 (0.002) 0.746 
B. Probabilities(%) 
Probability Mean S.E. Median Mean S.E. Median 
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spread between the open and the close. Similar results are obtained for the 
individual deciles and for brevity are not reported here. The variance of the 
location provides further evidence that, when the market opens, locations are 
more volatile than when the market closes. 
Panel B of Table 5 provides strong evidence that bid-ask bounce is due to 
systematic changes in the location of transactions within the bid-ask quotes. For 
example, 11.0% of the opening transactions are executed between the bid and 
ask quotes. In contrast, 26.5% of closing trades are executed between the bid 
and ask. On the other hand, the probabilities that the closing trade is at the bid 
or ask quote are 35.0% and 35.21%, and 45.3% and 42.8% on the opening. 
These results suggest that (1) at the close, trades are equally likely to occur at 
the bid as at the ask; (2) at the open, trades are more likely to be at the bid 
than at the ask price; and (3) trades are more likely to be within the quote at 
the close than at the open. 
Table 6 presents the cross-sectional average of the mean percentage effective 
spreads for the stocks in our sample using equation (6) and the effective spreads 
for the trading frequency deciles. The average effective spread declines from 
2.39% to 2.02% from open to close representing a 15.5% decline in the width of 
the effective spread. The narrowing of the spread for the tradmg frequency deciles 
is similar ranging from 12.8% to 19.5%. The reduction in the effective spread 
from the open to close may be due to dealers being more willing to execute 
customer limit orders within the bid-ask quotes, or to an increase in the number 
of offsetting customer buy and sell limit orders, or to increased dealer to dealer 
trading within the quotes. While all three possibilities are consistent with a 
reduction in uncertainty on the part of dealers or customers, other explanations, 
such as position squaring by dealers ahead of the non-trading period, exist. 
Table 6 provides additional insights into the results in Table 3. For inactive 
stocks, the effective spread is almost three times wider than for active stocks. 
Therefore, a 12.8% reduction in the effective spread from open to close causes a 
larger reduction in opening variance for inactive stocks than the 18.3% reduction 
in the effective spread causes for active stocks.10) Collectively, changes in trade 
-- - 
10) The mathematical intuition is as follows. In the equation for the variance ratio 
(Equation3). bid-ask bounce impacts the second and third term in the nunmator 
and denominator. 'Iherefore, proportional changes across tmding deciles in the e 
ffective spread need not imply a proportional reduction in the variance ratio across 
deciles due to (1) the presence of the first term (Var(r*lJ) in the numerator and 
denominator, and (2) the possible presence of other fadors in the second and third terms. 
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location imply a narrowing of the effective spread between the open and the 
close. The cross-sectional effects of the narrowing of the spread are consistent 
with the cross-sectional differences in bid-ask bounce. 
5.2.3 Regression Analysis 
Results of the previous section indicate that the variance ratio relates to the 
effective bid-ask spread, thus to the absolute value of the location variable. To 
investigate the relationship between the variance ratio of open-to-open relative to 
Table 6. Percentage Effective Bid-Ask Spreads for the Opening and Closing Trades 
The percentage effective spreads at the open and close of trading and the percentage 
decline in the effective spread from open to close for the 472 NASDAQ stocks in the full 
sample and for the trading frequency deciles for 1990 to 1992. We calculate the mean 
effective spread across the 3-year sample period for each firm and report the 
cross-sectional mean of each decile. The percentage decline is obtained from the difference 
in the cross-sectional mean for each decile. To create the trading frequency deciles, we 
first rank all firms in the sample based on the daily average number of transactions and 
divide them equally into ten groups (group 1 includes 49 stocks, groups 2 to group 10 
include 47 stocks each). 
Effective spreads by trading frequency decile 
Least Most 
All freq. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 freq. 
Opening trade 
Mean 2.39 2.98 3.05 3.13 2.87 2.67 2.34 1.98 2.07 1.64 1.15 
Closing tade 
Mean 2.02 2.60 2.61 2.68 2.44 2.24 1.93 1.63 1.70 1.32 0.94 
Percentage Decline 
Mean 15.5 12.8 14.4 14.4 15.0 16.1 17.5 17.7 17.9 19.5 18.3 
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close-to-close returns and locations, we perform the following regression analysis. 
We regress the variance ratio of open-to-open returns vs. close-to-close returns 
on the variance ratio of the location at the open and close. The regression in 
Table 7 is a cross-section and time-series regression. Specifically, the dependent 
2 0 variable is the variance ratio a ( Y )  / 0 ( Y ' )  for each f m  in each month 
using price-based returns. The independent variable is the variance ratio of the 
location at the open and close for the same firm and month. Since the 
distribution of the variance ratio is skewed, we take a logarithmic transformation 
for each variable. The regression equation is given by 
2 ( r4.t) d ( location 4.J In 2 ( C t )  = a +  b In d ( ~ o c a  tion :f ) + € i t  
If systematic changes in the variability of the location cause the return variance 
to be different between the open and close, we would expect a sigmiicant positive 
2 0 relationship between the variance ratio a ( Y  it) / a 2 ( ~ : t )  and the variance ratio 
of the location s Z ~ a t i o n O ~ / a  2~ tionci~. Thus, b should be positive. 
The OLS results are reported in Table 7. The estimate of coefficient b is 0.27 
and si@icant with t-statistic 26.2. Several other variables are also entertained 
in the time-series and cross-sectional regression analysis. These variables are 
constructed based on the trading volume (%) in number of trades at the open 
relative to total volume of the day, the trading volume (O/o) in number of trades at 
the close relative to total volume of the day, the trading volume (%) in number of 
shares at the open relative to total traded shares of the day, the open delay time 
(between 9:30 A.M. and the first transaction of the day), and the time between 
last trade and 4:30. However, all of these variables are insignificant and have no 
power in explaining the variance ratio o 2(r0iJ / r  2(rci J of individual f m s .  
The results for regressions for the trading frequency deciles produce results 
consistent with those of Table 3. Table 3 showed that bid-ask bounce was a 
sigruficant component of higher open-to-open volatility in price data for inactively 
traded firms, but the variance ratio of actively traded firms showed little evidence 
of bid-ask bounce effects. Since the location is a measure of systematic bid-ask 
effects, the results of Table 3 imply that the variance ratios of locations at the 
open and close would have more explanatory power for inactively traded stocks 
than for actively traded stocks. The results from Table 7 show that $b$, which 
measures the response of the variance ratio of returns to changes in the variance 
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Table 7. Cross-sectional and Time-series Regression Analysis 
The logarithmic variance ratio of price-based open-to-open returns vs. close-to-close 
returns for firm i in month t is regressed on the corresponding logarithmic variance ratio 
of the locations at the open and close. 
In d ( yo, ) = a +  bIn  d(L:t) 
& y 6 )  4 L :.t + & i t  
Loit denotes location at the open for stock i in month t. a 2(r0i~ is the price-based 
open-to-open return variance for stock i in month t. a '(LO~J is the variance of location at 
the open for stock i in month t. Definitions of variables corresponding to market closing 
are similar. Results are reported for the 472 NASDAQ stocks in the full sample and for 
the trading frequency deciles for 1990 to 1992. To create the trading frequency deciles, we 
first rank all firms in the sample based on the daily average number of transactions and 
divide them equally into ten groups (group 1 includes 49 stocks, groups 2 to group 10 
include 47 stocks each). 
t-stat t-stat 
~ d j  . R~ 
(%I 
All 0.08 (22.57) 
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ratio of locations, declines monotonically from 0.43 for the least actively traded 
decile to 0.03 for the most actively traded decile. The statistical s i ~ i c a n c e  of b 
and the adjusted R~ of the regression show similar striking declines from the 
least actively traded to most actively traded deciles. Therefore, bid-ask bounce 
seems to affect a stock's variance ratio inversely with respect to the stock's level 
of trading activity. 
To summarize, the regression results reveal a strong positive relationship 
between the variance ratio of open-to-open returns relative to close-to-close 
returns and the variance ratio of the locations at the firm level for the overall 
sample. This effect is due primarily to the behavior of less actively traded stocks. 
The relationship becomes weaker for more actively traded stocks. This is 
consistent with our previous result that for less actively traded stocks a 
substantial portion of the difference between the opening and closing variances 
are caused by the systematic behavior of the bid-ask effect at the open and 
close. The bid-ask bounce effect is best characterized as arising from the changes 
in the effective spread. 
5.3 Price Formation 
Results of the previous section have shown that pattern in bid-ask bounce 
explain about 67% of the difference between return variances at the open and 
close. While the bid-ask effect explains a substantial portion of the difference, the 
variance is still more volatile at the open than at the close for actively traded 
stocks. Therefore, for actively traded stocks there are factors in addition to bid-ask 
bounce that contribute to the difference in opening and closing variances. A 
possible factor is price formation which has been described in the noisy rational 
expectations models of Grundy and McNichols (1989), Brown and Jennings (1989) 
and Shalen (1993). In this section, we test whether the remaining difference 
between opening and closing variances is consistent with price formation models. 
5.3.1 Intraday Pattern of Twenty-Four Hour Variances 
According to price formation models, private information is revealed gradually 
through multiple rounds of trading. After the overnight non-trading period, the 
level of noise tends to be greater when the market first opens than when the 
market closes. As trading proceeds, investors learn from the observed prices. At 
the same time, more information arrives in the market. Such a learning process 
will force the level of noise to become smaller and smaller. The implication of 
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price formation models is that transitory volatility due to trading noise is the 
largest at the open and it gradually declines throughout the trading day. 
Since our goal is to determine whether evidence of price formation exists after 
bid-ask effects are eliminated, we perform our analysis using quote-based returns 
to eliminate the bid-ask bounce. The employment of quote-based returns is 
justified as follows. Using the location parameter of equation (4) and defining the 
proportional bid-ask spread, st, as (At - BJ/Mt, we can approximate the 
price-based continuously compounded return, rn, as 
where r~~ is the quote-based return.11) Therefore, quote-based returns are free 
from both changes in the location of trades within the spread and changes in 
the width of the quoted spread. 
Recall that variances of most actively traded stocks (i.e., deciles 9 and 10) are 
about 10% more volatile at the open relative to the close. For these stocks, 
bid-ask bounce explains little of the difference in volatility. Therefore, if the 
remaining unexplained volatility is primarily due to price formation, these 
stocks should show a strong declining pattern in 24-hour variance over the 
day. 
To test the validity of the price formation model, we use the method suggested 
by Gerety and Mulherin (1994). Specifically, we calculate the quote-based 
variance ratio of open-to-open returns to those of time t-to-time t. We select 
values for time t of 11:OO A.M., 12:OO P.M., 1:00 P.M., 2:00 P.M., 3:00 P.M., and 
4:00 P.M. If transitory price uncertainty contributes to the elevated open-to-open 
volatility, the time t-to-the t variance should decline gradually throughout the 
day. Therefore, the ratio of open-to-open variance relative to time t-to-time t 
variance increases gradually. 
A technical dmculty arises from the definition of the opening quote. While 
other quotes are measured on the basis of clock time, the opening quote is 
defined relative to the first transaction. Thus, when there is a severe opening 
delay, the time of the opening quote may not always precede the time of the t 
o'clock quote. To solve this problem, we use three alternative methods. When the 
time stamp associated with t o'clock quote is earlier than the time stamp of the 
11) We drop firm is subscript for simplicity. 
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opening quote, (i) the entire day is excluded from the analysis, (ii) the t o'clock 
quote is treated as missing, or (iii) the t o'clock quote is replaced with the 
opening quote. Since they yield very similar results, we report the results 
obtained using the first method only. 
Summary statistics of variance ratios are calculated using the same method 
as described in Section 3 and reported in Table 8 for quote-based returns. For 
actively traded stocks, the average variance ratio of open-to-open vs. time 
t-to-time t gradually increases as t increases. For example, for stocks in the 
most actively traded decile, the variance ratio is 0.99 for open-to-open vs. 
1 l:00-to-1 l:00 A.M. and it subsequently rises to 1.10 for open-to-open vs. 
4:OO-to-4:00 P.M. These results suggest that market participants learn from 
the observed prices through sequential trading and thus the stock price 
becomes less volatile as trading proceeds. The evidence is consistent with the 
prediction of the price formation models and supports price formation as an 
explanation for the remaining difference between opening and closing 
variances. In contrast, variance ratios for thinly traded stocks are close to one 
throughout the day. 
5.3.2 Robustness of the Results 
While the cross-sectional pattern is striking, it could be simply a manifestation 
of the quote setting practice on NASDAQ rather than evidence that trading 
facilitates price discovery. If quotes for less actively traded stocks are excessively 
wide, quote midpoint returns at successive openings and closings are more likely 
to be the same for inactive than active stocks as adjustments may take place 
within the wide quotes. This would imply that the use of midquote data would 
understate the impact of trading on price formation for inactive stocks. We 
measure a subset of days where the quote midpoint return is zero for both 
open-to-open and close-to-close returns as a proxy for the frequency of identical 
quote midpoint returns at successive openings and closings. For the most actively 
traded stocks (decile lo), both open-to-open and close-to-close returns are zero 
on 1.2% of the days in our sample. In stark contrast, for the least actively 
traded stocks (decile l), about 32% of days experience zero returns. This 
indicates that price formation may occur within the quotes for inactive stocks on 
the days where the quotes do not change. To minimize any influence that may 
be associated with unchanging quotes, we repeat the experiment after excluding 
days on which both open-to-open and close-to-close returns are zero. The result, 
as reported in Table 9, is almost indistinguishable from that in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Median-Based Variance Ratios for the Opening vs. Successive Times of Day 
(Excluding days on which the time stamp of the opening quote is later than that of 
the time-t quote) 
S m a r y  statistics for the quote-based open-to-open vs. Time t-to-time t variance ratios 
of the 472 NASDAQ stocks for the trading frequency deciles for 1990 to 1992. For each 
time interval. we calculate the variance ratio for each firm in each month, and get the 
median variance ratio across 472 stocks in each month. Next, we obtain the average and 
standard error of these median variance ratios across the 36-month sample period. u 2, is 
the variance of the quote-based open-to-open return. a 2t is the variance of the time t -to- 
t return calculated using the most recent quote before time t on each day. To create the 
trading fi-equency deciles, we first rank all firms in the sample based on the daily average 
number of transactions and divide them equally into ten groups (group 1 includes 49 
stocks, groups 2 to group 10 include 47 stocks each). 
Trading frequency decile 
Least Most 
freq. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 freq. 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
(S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) 
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Table 9. Median-Based Variance Ratios for the Opening vs. Successive Times of Day 
(Excluding days when both open-to-open and close-to-close returns are zero) 
S m a r y  statistics for the quote-based open-to-open vs. Time t-to-time t variance ratios 
of the 472 NASDAQ stocks for the trading frequency deciles for 1990 to 1992. For each 
time interval, we calculate the variance ratio for each firm in each month, and get the 
median variance ratio across 472 stocks in each month. Next, we obtain the average and 
standard error of these median variance ratios across the 36-month sample period. a 2, is 
the variance of the quote-based open-to-open return. a 2t is the variance of the time t-to- t 
return calculated using the most recent quote before time t on each day. To create the 
trading frequency deciles, we first rank all firms in the sample based on the daily average 
number of transactions and divide them equally into ten groups (group 1 includes 49 
stocks, groups 2 to group 10 include 47 stocks each). 
Trading frequency decile 
Least Most 
freq . 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 freq . 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
(S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) 
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Table 10. Median-Based Variance Ratios for the opening vs. Successive Times of Day 
(Using 1990 data instead of 1990-1992 data to get trading-frequency ranking) 
Summary statistics for the quote-based open-to-open vs. Time t-to-time t variance ratios 
of the 472 NASDAQ stocks for the trading frequency deciles for 1991 to 1992. For each 
time interval, we calculate the variance ratio for each firm in each month, and get the 
median variance ratio across 472 stocks in each month. Next, we obtain the average and 
standard error of these median variance ratios across the 24-month sample period. n 2, is 
the variance of the quote-based open-to-open return. u 2t is the variance of the time t to- t 
return calculated using the most recent quote before time t on each day. To create the 
trading frequency deciles, we first rank all firms in the sample based on the daily average 
number of transactions in 1990 and divide them equally into ten groups (group 1 includes 
49 stocks, groups 2 to group 10 include 47 stocks each). 
- - - - ~  
Trading frequency decile 
Least Most 
freq. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 freq. 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
(S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) (S. E.) 
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Therefore, even on the days where the quotes change, there is little evidence of 
price formation due to trading for inactive stocks. 
Another concern may arise regarding the use of trading frequency as the 
classification variable. While we cannot think of a better variable that captures 
the essence of price formation models, trading frequency is certainly an 
endogenous variable, which makes the interpretation of our results difficult. To 
address this issue, we divide the sample period into two mutually exclusive 
subperiods: 1990 and 1991-1992. We use the first period to allocate f m s  to ten 
trading frequency deciles. Keeping the decile composition constant, we apply the 
procedure described in the previous subsection to the second period data only. 
As shown in Table 10, the results are similar to those reported in Table 8. 
To summarize the results reported in this section, we find evidence consistent 
with the view that trading facilitates price discovery more for those stocks that 
trade more actively. The evidence from actively traded stocks is consistent with 
the result of Gerety and Mulherin (1994) for the Dow Jones index. Gerety and 
Mulherin find the variance of the Dow Jones index return measured at the end 
of each hourly interval declines throughout the day. Our result, as well as that 
of Gerety and Mulherin, supports price formation models for actively traded 
stocks. However, thinly traded stocks do not exhibit a pattern of price 
formation. 
5.4 Price Formation Before the Opening 
So far, we have examined the latest pre-opening quotes but not other 
pre-opening quotes because we have used these quotes merely to assess 
the importance of the bid-ask bounce effect on the opening. For such a 
purpose, only the quote prevailing at the time of the opening transaction is 
relevant. However, the existence of multiple pre-opening quotes raises an 
interesting question: Does price discovery take place prior to the opening 
transaction?l2) This is a potentially important issue, because the lack of a 
formal opening procedure on the NASDAQ, coupled with the existence of 
multiple market makers, may make price discovery around the opening 
difficult compared to other exchanges. If pre-opening quotes facilitate price 
discovery before the opening, they can be viewed as a mechanism 
alleviating such a difficulty. 
12) We are grateful to Reni, Stulz for suggesting this possibility. 
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To explore the possibility of pre-opening price discovery, we first examine the 
impact of the overnight price shock on quote revision activities. Although the role 
of quotes in price discovery when there is no trading remains uncertain, we 
conjecture that there would be a positive relationship between the magnitude of 
the overnight shock and the frequency of pre-opening quote changes. This is 
because market makers would face increased incentives to reveal their 
information when faced with greater uncertainty about the equilibrium price. 
These incentives would include reputational costs of appearing poorly informed in 
communications with their customers and real costs of trading at non- 
equilibrium prices. 
Table 11 shows that there is only one pre-opening quote on many trading days 
(66%) and the average number of pre-opening quotes is only 1.9.13) However, the 
average number of pre-opening quotes increases dramatically to 6.6 on days 
when the overnight return is greater than 3% or less than -3%, where the 
overnight return is measured as the logarithmic quote midpoint return from the 
closing quote to the latest pre-opening quote. This evidence is consistent with the 
notion that price discovery is needed more on days with larger overnight price 
shocks. 
We further examine whether pre-opening quotes are better predictors of the 
opening price than is the closing quote from the previous day. We define the 
percentage prediction error as the difference between the quote midpoint and the 
opening transaction price divided by the opening transaction price. Because the 
number of pre-opening quotes varies over days and across stocks, we consider 
only the earliest and the latest pre-opening quotes. For each predictor, we 
calculate the square of the percentage prediction error on each day for each firm, 
and get the cross-sectional median squared error, MSE, on each day. The 
time-series mean of the MSE is reported in Table 12. We also obtain the 
Werence in the MSE between the two predictors, the closing quote on the 
previous day and the first pre-opening quote (or the latest pre-opening quote). 
The time-series mean and standard error of the difference are reported in Table 
12. 
Panel A in Table 12 shows that the average MSEs are 1.43, 1.31 and 1.09, 
respectively, when using the closing quote on the previous day, the first 
pre-opening quote and the latest pre-opening quote to predict the first 
13) As in Table 2, We first calculate the daily average for each firm, and then report the 
cross-sectional mean. 
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Table 1 1. Summary Statistics of Pre-opening Quotes 
Summary statistics of pre-opening quotes for the 472 NASDAQ stocks in the full sample 
and for the trading frequency deciles for 1990 to 1992. For each variable, we calculate the 
daily average for each firm during the 3-year sample period and report the cross-sectional 
mean. To create the trading frequency deciles, we first rank all firms in the sample based 
on the daily average number of transactions and divide them into ten groups (group 1 
includes 49 stocks, groups 2 to group 10 include 47 stocks each). # of quotes is the daily 
average number of pre-opening quotes. # of quotes overnight retum exceeding .3% is the 
average number of pre-opening quotes when the overnight return exceeded 3%. % of days 
with 1 pre-opening quote is the percentage of days on which there is only one pre-opening 
quote. Minutes elapsed from 1st pre-opening quote to 9:30 A.M. is the time lag between 
the 1st pre-opening quote and 9:30 A.M. when NASDAQ officially opens. Minutes elapsed 
from latest pre-opening quote to 9:30 A.M. is the time lag between the latest pre-opening 
quote and 9:30 A.M. when NASDAQ officially opens. 





2 3 4 5 7 8 9 
freq. freq. 
# of quotes 1.93 1.55 1.65 1.60 1.73 1.83 1.81 1.95 2.04 2.36 2.83 
Overnight return 
6.63 5.78 5.55 5.80 5.54 5.73 7.20 6.84 7.10 7.64 9.00 
Exceeding + 3% 
% of days with 








43 50 47 50 50 45 46 43 41 34 28 
pre-pening quote 
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Table 12. Forecasting Performance of Pre-opening Quotes 
Relative to the Closing Quote of the Previous Day 
This table reports summary statistics of forecasting errors when using the closing quote 
on day t-1 and the pre-opening quote on day t to predict the first transaction price on day 
t. For each predictor, we calculate the square of the percentage prediction error on each 
day for each firm, and get the cross-sectional median squared error, MSE, on each day. 
The time-series mean of the MSE is reported in the table. We also obtain the difference in 
the MSE between two predictors, and report its time-series mean and standard error in 
the table. Several sets of pre-opening quotes are considered in the forecasting comparison: 
(A) the first and latest pre-opening quotes for all trading days; (B) the first and latest 
pre-opening quotes when there are at least two pre-opening quotes on a trading day; and 
(C) the first, second and latest pre-opening quotes when there are at least three 
pre-opening quotes on a trading day. 
MSE Difference in MSE 
Predictor Mean Predictor Mean Mean (S.E.) 
A. All trading days 
Closing quote 1.43 1 st pre-opening quote 1.3 1 0.12 (0.018) 
Closing quote 1.43 Latest pre-opening quote 1.09 0.34 (0.035) 
B. Trading days on which there are at least two pre-opening quotes 
Closing quote 1.3 1 1 st  pre-opening quote 1.08 0.23 (0.027) 
Closing quote 1.3 1 Latest pre-opening quote 0.6 1 0.70 (0.040) 
C. Trading days on which there are at  least three pre-opening quotes 
Closing quote 1.37 1 st  pre-opening quote 1.28 0.09 (0.030) 
Closing quote 1.37 2nd pre-opening quote 0.90 0.47 (0.037) 
Closing quote 1.37 Latest pre-opening quote 0.50 0.87 (0.060) 
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transaction price. In comparison to the closing quote on the previous day, the 
median squared errors are reduced by about 8% and 24% when using the first 
pre-opening quote and latest pre-opening quote as predictors of the first 
transaction price. The reduction is statistically simcant. Therefore, pre-opening 
quotes are indeed better predictors of the opening price than the closing quotes 
on the previous day, and even the earliest pre-opening quotes perform better 
than the previous closing quotes. 
In the above analysis, we include the days that have only one pre-opening 
quote. As the opening transaction is based on the latest pre-opening quote, 
the latest pre-opening quote is likely to have the least prediction error 
among all quotes that are available prior to the opening. Therefore, if the 
earliest pre-opening quote is also the latest pre-opening quote, the above 
result likely overstates the predictability of the earliest pre-opening quote. To 
avoid this pitfall, we select only those days on which there is more than one 
pre-opening quote and repeat the experiment. Panel B of Table 12 shows 
that the earliest pre-opening quote, which is not subject to the above 
problem, still predicts the opening price better than the previous closing 
quote. Using the first pre-opening quote to predict the first transaction price 
will lead to a 18% reduction in the MSE over using the closing quote on the 
previous day. Furthermore, as Panel C indicates, the magnitude of the 
prediction error declines through successive updating of the quotes. It 
suggests that price discovery takes place on NASDAQ before the market 
opens, even in the absence of trading. This is in sharp contrast to other 
exchanges, including the NYSE and AMEX, where pre-opening quotes are 
generally not available. 
VI . Conclusion 
In this paper, we demonstrate that returns of NASDAQ stocks conform to the 
patterns reported for NYSE stocks by Amihud and Mendelson (1987) and Stoll 
and Whaley (1990) by exhibiting greater volatility around the market opening 
than closing. Since opening and closing mechanisms are the same on the 
NASDAQ, our results suggest factors other than market structure attribute to the 
greater opening volatility for NASDAQ stocks. 
We find a systematic relationship between the source of excess opening 
volatility and trading activity. Evidence from individual stocks indicates that 
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bid-ask bounce contributes, in aggregate, about 67% of the difference in opening 
and closing volatilities. Furthermore, we find that the bid-ask bounce effect varies 
substantially across trading frequency deciles, contributing 92\% of the elevated 
opening variance for inactively traded stocks and 20% for actively traded stocks. 
The source of bid-ask bounce is identified as si@icant changes in the location 
of trades within the bid-ask quote between the open and the close rather than 
the changes in posted spreads. That is, opening transactions are more likely to 
occur at either the bid or ask than are closing transactions, and the trade is 
more likely to be executed within the bid and ask at the close of trading than at 
the open. 
We use mid-quote returns to control for the bid-ask effect and test for evidence 
of price formation. We find price uncertainty is gradually resolved throughout the 
day as trading proceeds for actively trade stocks. Thus, the remaining difference 
between the opening and closing variances after eliminating the bid-ask bounce 
effect is consistent with the implication of price formation models. For thinly 
traded stocks, in contrast, the 24-hour return variance is almost the same from 
the beginning to the end of the trading day, showing no evidence of price 
formation. 
We further investigate whether price discovery takes place on NASDAQ before 
the market opens. The existence of multiple, pre-opening quotes provides an 
unique opportunity to examine price discovery in the absence of trading. We 
find pre-opening quotes are better predictors of the opening price than is the 
closing quote from the previous day. For those trading days on which there are 
multiple pre-opening quotes, later pre-opening quotes are better predictors of 
the first transaction price than are earlier pre-opening quotes. Therefore, price 
discovery does take place before the market opens and in the absence of 
trading. 
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